Individualism and Political Stability

Minhyeon Jeong () and Wongi Kim ()
Additional contact information
Minhyeon Jeong: KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP), Postal: [30147] Building C Sejong National Research Complex 370 Sicheong-daero Sejong-si Korea,, https://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/
Wongi Kim: Sungshin Women's University, Postal: Donam Sujung Campus: 2 34 da-gil Bomun-ro Seongbuk-gu Seoul (02844) Tel. +82-920-7114 | Mia Woonjung Green Campus: 55 76 ga-gil Dobong-ro Gangbuk-gu Seoul (01133) Tel. +82 2-920-7870,, https://www.sungshin.ac.kr/main_eng/index.do

No 23-5, Working Papers from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: This study analyzes the relationship between individualism as a cultural trait and political instability as a political characteristic. The intuition of the analysis is that cultural traits can determine political preferences of members of society. The study considers a specific political belief: “How much should the government protect individual property rights?” which extends to broader political beliefs such as profree market vs. pro-redistribution. According to numerous studies, individualistic cultures tend to support stronger protection of property rights than collectivist cultures. If the degree of protection of property rights is determined by the political choices of the members of society, it can be inferred that the political preferences that lead to strong protection of property rights reflect the individualistic cultures inherent in society members. That is, the political preferences of society members regarding the degree of property rights protection―or, in a broader sense, pro-free market versus pro-redistribution―are influenced by their cultural traits of individualism or collectivism. This study presents a politico-economic model that captures this intuition. The theoretical results are as follows. First, in societies where neither individualism nor collectivism dominates, political preferences for free-market or redistribution contrast more sharply than in societies where individualism or collectivism dominates. Second, this contrast in political preferences leads to political instability, such that societies where neither individualism nor collectivism dominates tend to be more politically unstable. This study provides empirical evidence supporting the theoretical results. This study identifies a relationship between cultural traits, political preferences and political instability, shedding light on the impact of culture on economic growth. In a nutshell, societies with highly heterogeneous cultural traits among their members are prone to polarization of political preferences, leading to political instability, which constrains economic growth in the long run.

Keywords: culture; political instability; institutions; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E02 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2023-12-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:kiepwp:2023_005

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