The quest for the perfect auction

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No 2020-1, Nobel Prize in Economics documents from Nobel Prize Committee

Abstract: Every day, auctions distribute astronomical values between buyers and sellers. This year’s Laureates, Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson, have improved auction theory and invented new auction formats, benefitting sellers, buyers and taxpayers around the world

Keywords: Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2020-10-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-his, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-ore
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