A Concessions-Based Mechanism for Meta-Bargaining Problems

Maria del Carmen Marco-Gil (), Josep E. Peris and Begoña Subiza
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Maria del Carmen Marco-Gil: Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena, Department of Economics, Postal: Pza. del Cronista Isidoro Valverde, Edif. La Milagrosa, 30202 Cartagena.

No 12-13, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: In 1950, Nash's seminal paper introduced the axiomatic approach to the analysis of bargaining situations. Since then, many bargaining solutions have appeared and been axiomatically analyzed. The fact that agents, when face a bargaining problem, can come up with different solution concepts (that is, di§erent notions of fairness and equity) was first introduced by van Damme (1986) by means of the meta-bargaining model. In this paper we present and axiomatically analyze a mechanism for solving meta-bargaining problems, which we call Unanimous-Concession. As an example, we show that the Nash solution is the result of the meta-bargaining process we define, when agents have dual egalitarian criteria. Finally, we compare, from an axiomatic and descriptive point of view, our proposal with other meta-bargaining mechanisms.

Keywords: bargaining problem; mechanism; meta-bargaining; axiomatic approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2012-07-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_013

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