A Representative Committee by Approval Balloting

Begoña Subiza and Josep E. Peris

No 16-4, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we use approval balloting and propose a new voting procedure that guarantees that if there is a committee that represents (with a given proportion of representatives) all of the existing voters, then the selected committee has to represent all of voters in at least the same proportion. This property is a way of selecting a committee that represents completely all of voters when such a committee exists. The usual voting rules in this context do not satisfy this condition.

Keywords: Approval balloting; committee election; unanimity; justified representation; representativeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2016-10-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Journal Article: A Representative Committee by Approval Balloting (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2016_004

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