Randomly Selected Representative Committees

Michael J. Hasday, Josep E. Peris and Begoña Subiza
Additional contact information
Michael J. Hasday: Anderson & Ochs, LLP.

No 19-4, QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory

Abstract: When selecting a committee that decides for an entire body of members of a society (a court, legislature, etc.) two main methods are used: random assignment and direct election (whereby the latter method is made by some authority). It is known that both methods have some flaws (Hasday, 2017). We present a new method that proposes a pool of committees so that by randomly selecting a committee within this pool, all members in the society have equal opportunities of being selected and properties of representativeness and coherence are fulfilled.

Keywords: Representative Committee; Panel Assignment; Institutional Design; Random Assignment; Outlier Panel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2019-09-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://web.ua.es/es/dmcte/documentos/qmetwp1904.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:qmetal:2019_004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in QM&ET Working Papers from University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Julio Carmona ().