Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly

Nirvikar Singh and Xavier Vives

RAND Journal of Economics, 1984, vol. 15, issue 4, 546-554

Abstract: This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown that if firms can only make two types of binding contracts with consumers, the price contract and the quantity contract, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity (price) contract, provided the goods are substitutes (complements).

Date: 1984
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