Random Actions in Experimental Zero-Sum Games

Jung S You

Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, 2021, vol. 13, issue 1, 69-81

Abstract: A mixed strategy, a strategy of unpredictable actions, is applicable to business, politics, and sports. Playing mixed strategies, however, poses a challenge, as the game theory involves calculating probabilities and executing random actions. I test i.i.d. hypotheses of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with the simplest experiments in which student participants play zero-sum games in multiple iterations and possibly figure out the optimal mixed strategy (equilibrium) through the games. My results confirm that most players behave differently from the Nash equilibrium prediction for the simplest 2x2 zero-sum game (matching-pennies) and 3x3 zero-sum game (e.g., the rock-paper-scissors game). The results indicate the need to further develop theoretical models that explain a non-Nash equilibrium behavior.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnd:arjebs:v:13:y:2021:i:1:p:69-81

DOI: 10.22610/jebs.v13i1(J).3150

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