Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union
C. Randall Henning and
Martin Kessler
Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2012, vol. 6, 31 pages
Abstract:
This essay on US fiscal federalism builds on the established tradition. But unlike many papers that take current US features as a given, the authors tell us what present arrangements governing responsibility over public debt gradually emerged from, and why. By bringing in the historical dimension and the trial-and-error process that took place over more than two centuries, they help us understand the logic behind alternative arrangements and why the current one has in the end prevailed.
Keywords: fiscal federalism; USA; public debt; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1254
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