Rentseeking Behavior in Systems with a Complex Structure
Рентоориентированное поведение в системах со сложной структурой
Mark Levin and
Nadezhda Shilova
Working Papers from Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Abstract:
The paper contains a review of works on rentseeking with special attention paid to political corruption and corruptive networks. We also present here a theoretical model of rentseeking behavior in complex systems. The results of the model are tested not as it is usually done by speculative data about volumes of corruption, but on mass media reports about anticorruption measures in Russia. We used this data because Russian mass media is dependent on the few powerful interest groups, so through analyzing the texts we can derive which interest groups these are. As it was predicted for the developing countries in Africa, we fund out that these groups are Army and Police. This proves that in developing countries political stability is supported not by economic development, but by status-quo between well-organized militarized rent-seeking groups.
Keywords: rentseeking behavior; corruption; graph method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2016-07-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-pol, nep-sog and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:wpaper:2272
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