Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model

Tasos Kalandrakis

No WP65, Wallis Working Papers from University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy

Abstract: Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities, and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. This approach recovers Eraslan's (2002) uniqueness result and relies on a characterization of equilibria in terms of two variables that satisfy a pair of piecewise linear equations.

Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model (2015)
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