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Distorsiuni concurentiale si solutii optime: concentrari economice, abuz de pozitie dominanta, practici verticale si interventii ale statului

Paul Prisecaru
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Paul Prisecaru: Consiliului Concurentei

Studii Economice from Institutul National de Cercetari Economice (INCE)

Abstract: In this paper, the best solutions available, in the author's opinion, to restore the competitive environment in the case of four competitive distortions, are selectively presented. First, two relatively recent case studies from US and EU, are presented. These cases, namely AT&T / T-Mobile (USA) and NYSE Euronext / Deutsche Börse (EU), are relevant for the latest approaches to measuring economic efficiency in relation to anti-competitive effects. Secondly, regarding the interaction between competition policy, namely abuse of dominant position, and intellectual property rights, the Magill and IMS Health, both EU cases, are summarized and a brief discussion of the European Commission's approach in Microsoft and Google cases is presented. Certainly, future developments in the abuse of dominant position are difficult to predict, but the intersection of competition law and intellectual property rights will generate further evolving jurisprudence. Thirdly, vertical restrictive practices (agreements between companies at different levels of the production and distribution chain) are approached from a new perspective, providing as a solution a decision matrix that combines both the American and European approaches. Finally, for evaluating and eliminating distortions of competition caused by public regulations, the paper describes the tools developed by the OECD and the relevant experience in applying these tools in other states. The OECD Checklist is currently the best instrument in the world for regulatory impact assessment, backed by outstanding practical results, particularly to Australia.

Keywords: mergers; efficiencies; abuse of dominant position; intellectual property rights; vertical restraints; resale price maintenance; regulatory impact assessment; competition toolkit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ror:seince:150924

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