Votes for Sale

Rohit Ticku

No 2023/55, RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: This paper examines the financial gains derived from holding public office for independentlegislators in India. Given that party-affiliated legislators are legally prohibited from engagingin cross-voting or defection, I hypothesize that independent legislators can secure rents whentheir support becomes pivotal for government formation. Utilizing candidate asset disclosuresfrom Indian state elections spanning 2003 to 2012, I demonstrate that independent legislatorsamass wealth at a faster pace than their party-affiliated counterparts in states where thelargest party or coalition falls short of a majority. The point estimates suggest that, for eachadditional seat that the largest party or coalition falls short of a majority, an independentlegislator experiences an approximate 2% annual increase in their assets relative to a partyaffiliated legislator. The disproportionate gains are particularly prominent in movable assets,implying a potential quid-pro-quo involving cash payments.

Keywords: Independent politicians; Government formation; Political rents; Asset growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 N35 N45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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