The positive theory of benefit taxation in the italian school of public finance

Paolo Liberati and Massimo Paradiso

No 190, Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' from Department of Economics - University Roma Tre

Abstract: This paper addresses the historical evolution of benefit-based taxation, with particular reference to the contribution of the Italian school of public finance. In particular, it is shown that the positive interpretation of the benefit theory as a criterion of rationality and judgment is well established in the Italian tradition of public finance. Indeed, the practice of taxation as interpreted by Italian scholars reflects more the outcome of a political bargaining, rather than the consistent application of any normative principle as in the contribution by Lindahl (1919). Under this perspective, the benefit theory may help the functioning of a system of democratic finance, in order to avoid large deviations of the level of taxation from its natural path. Thus, the concept remains of a fundamental role played by the benefit principle in its positive guise as a base for judgments and control of the action of governments.

Keywords: Benefit theory; Italian public finance; Taxation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 N00 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0190

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