Anti-mafia policies and public goods in Italy
Stefania Fontana
No 272, Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' from Department of Economics - University Roma Tre
Abstract:
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of the anti-mafia dismissal policy in municipal councils for mafia infiltration on the share of public goods in Italy. The implementation of policies aimed at reducing the mafia’s influence on local political bodies can improve the level of essential public goods that are relevant for social inclusion and regional development. The results suggest that during the years after a dismissal, municipalities devote more resources to public goods, with an estimated increase of approximately 5.3 pp. Notably, the effect seems to be driven by an increase in investment of approximately 5.4 pp, whereas the effect on consumption is uncertain. We therefore conclude that policies targeting the problem of criminal infiltration in local governments can improve socioeconomic conditions by enhancing the level of economically and socially relevant local public goods.
Keywords: anti-mafia policies; mafia infiltration; public goods; local governments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D04 H41 H75 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0272
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