Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation:Implications for Public-Private Partnerships

Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort

No 195, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: Whilst a lot has been said about how to fight corruption at tender stage in public procurement, post-tender corruption is an issue that remains almost unexplored. In this paper, we make a step towards filling this gap, by studying the relationship between the quality of a country's institutions, in particular its monitoring technologies and corruption, and the level and form of risk transfer to the contractor. We discuss the desirability of state-contingent clauses, which provide insurance to the contractor but are at high risk of manipulation. We derive implications on the benefit and cost of procurement forms which are based on high levels of risk transfer to the private sector, such as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).

Keywords: Corruption; Public Private Partnerships and Risk transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D82 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2011-05-19, Revised 2011-05-19
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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