Maintaining Competition in Recurrent Procurement Contracts: A case study on the London Bus Market

Elisabetta Iossa and Michael Waterson

No 400, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: Under recurrent procurement, the awarding of a contract to a firm may put it in an advantageous position in future tenders, which may reduce competition over time. The objective of this paper is to study the dynamics of competition for tendered contracts, focusing on factors that may generate incumbent advantage. Particular attention is given to learning economies, sunk costs of entry and switching costs for the procurer. The paper then applies these insights to analyse empirically the evolution of competition in the market for local bus services in London.

Keywords: Dynamic Competition; Procurement and Incumbent advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L24 L40 L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2017-02-24, Revised 2017-02-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Maintaining competition in recurrent procurement contracts: A case study on the London bus market (2019)
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