On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser ()
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Gwenaël Piaser: IPAG Business School

No 441, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Economic models of exclusive competition restrict principals to use standard direct mechanisms, which induce truthful revelation of agents’ exogenous private information. This paper investigates the rationale for this restriction. We provide two results. First, we construct examples showing that direct mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that truth-telling strongly robust equilibrium outcomes survive against principals’ unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms.

Keywords: Competing Mechanisms; Exclusive Competition; Incomplete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2018-08-09, Revised 2018-08-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (2018)
Working Paper: On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (2018)
Working Paper: On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (2015)
Working Paper: On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (2015)
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