Theory of patronized goods. Liberal evolution of paternalism

Рубинштейн Александр Яковлевич
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alexander Yakovlevich Rubinstein

Working papers from Institute of Economics

Abstract: The neo-classical principles of rational behavior are considered in the context of the nature of normative interests is discussed in concern of political aspects. The article illustrates the theoretical and the practical aspects of the concept of consociation democracy, providing liberalization of the institutions for making political and economic decisions. The results of analysis reveal a pattern of paternalism drifting towards institutional liberalization. Proposed a hypothesis explaining why the economic policy in modern Russia still remains somewhere between archaic and merit paternalism.

Keywords: patronized goods; rational behavior; merit paternalism; consociational democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D5 D6 D7 H41 Z28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Iinternational journal of entrepreneurial knowledge, 2016, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 6-29

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Journal Article: Theory Of Patronized Goods. Liberal Evolution Of Paternalism (2016)
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