Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives

Sophie Claeys, G. Lanine () and Koen Schoors

Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: We focus on the conflict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stability and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in 1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that violate the individuals’ deposits to capital ratio, because this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability.

Keywords: Bank supervision; bank crisis; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 G2 N2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 64 pages
Date: 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cis, nep-fin, nep-mac and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rug:rugwps:05/307

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