Are private banks more efficient than public banks? Evidence from Russia

Alexei Karas, Koen Schoors and Laurent Weill

Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and – surprisingly – that domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the bank’s environment, management’s risk preferences, the bank’s activity mix or size, the econometric approach, or the introduction of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization.

Keywords: Bank Efficiency; State Ownership; Foreign ownership; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 P30 P34 P52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2008-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-eff and nep-tra
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Are private banks more efficient than public banks ? Evidence from Russia (2008)
Working Paper: Are private banks more efficient than public banks? Evidence from Russia (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rug:rugwps:08/519

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