No-Fault Divorce and Rent-Seeking

S. Bracke (), Koen Schoors and G. Verschelden ()
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G. Verschelden: -

Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: Couples filing for divorce in Belgium have the option to either opt for a no-fault divorce trajectory or a consensual trajectory. We analyse the determinants of divorce trajectory choice and of the resulting post-divorce transfers. The no-fault trajectory is more likely, if spouses are more specialised in either domestic or labour market production. This is consistent with a theory of divorce as rent extraction. Child support payments depend neither on the divorce trajectory nor on alimony transfers or relative incomes, but are driven by the payer's wage and the child(ren)'s residence. Partner alimony transfers are higher for no-fault unilateral divorces with pronounced self sacrifice.

Keywords: Divorce; Bargaining; Law and Legislation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D14 K36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rug:rugwps:10/681

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