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Political connections and depositor discipline

M. Disli (), Koen Schoors and Jos Meir

Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium from Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Abstract: We analyze how political connections affect depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician’s party is currently in power, but less so if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term tend to depart with them.

Keywords: Depositor Discipline; Political connections; Banks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 G1 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2012-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political connections and depositor discipline (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Political connections and depositor discipline (2013) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rug:rugwps:12/781

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