Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties

Gil Epstein and Ira Gang

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.

Keywords: foreign aid; rent seeking; governance; decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 O10 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2006-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2006-29.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Decentralizing Aid with Interested Parties (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:200629

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