Information Transparency, Fairness and Labor Market Efficiency

Ebru Isgin () and Barry Sopher
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Ebru Isgin: West Chester University

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper studies the role of information transparency on fairness concerns, welfare and efficiency. When the firm's productivity and ultimately profits are revealed, wage offers induce relatively fair divisions of potential gains and workers respond with higher performance. Workers respond not only to wages but also to firms' intentions concerning fairness. Information transparency serves as a mechanism that promotes fairness and performance while the lack of transparency results in reduced earnings for workers and market inefficiency.

Keywords: Experiments; Incomplete Contracts; Fairness; Information Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D8 J (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2013-01-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2013-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information transparency, fairness and labor market efficiency (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201303

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