THE EVOLUTION OF BANK BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN NEW YORK, 1840-1950

Eugene White () and Howard Bodenhorn

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Contemporary bank governance is criticized for manager-dominated (insider) boards of directors, but from the beginning of the nineteenth century, bank presidents appear also to have operated as chairmen of the boards of directors. However, the managers were constrained by a variety of rules that tended to align the interests of management, shareholders and other stakeholders until the mid-twentieth century. We trace this development through New York banking law and new data on banks chartered by the State of New York.

Keywords: corporate governance; board of directors; bank history (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G3 N21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2014-05-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published Previously circulated as NBER Working paper No. 20078 (2014)

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Related works:
Chapter: The Evolution of Bank Boards of Directors in New York, 1840–1950 (2014)
Working Paper: The Evolution of Bank Boards of Directors in New York, 1840-1950 (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201404

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