Perfect Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We obtain conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game with infinitely many types and/or strategies that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The main existence results are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions.

Keywords: infinite game of incomplete information; perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium; payoff security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2017-02-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2017-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201703

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