Point-Rationalizability in Large Games

Haomiao Yu

No 30, Working Papers from Toronto Metropolitan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, I characterize point-rationalizability in large non-anonymous games with three di erent formulations of societal responses, and also propose an implicit dynamic process that is informed by Guesnerie's eductive notions. Given the introspection and 'mentalizing' that the point-rationalizability notions presuppose, a motivation behind the work is to examine their viability in situations where the terms rationality and full information can be given a more parsimonious, and thereby more analytically viable, expression.

Keywords: Large games; Nash equilibria; point-rationalizability; closed under rational behavior (curb); societal response; distribution; integration; transformed statistics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D50 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.arts.ryerson.ca/economics/repec/pdfs/wp030.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp030

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Toronto Metropolitan University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Doosoo Kim ().