Large Games with a Bio-Social Typology

M. Khan, Kali Rath, Yeneng Sun () and Haomiao Yu
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Kali Rath: Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame

No 35, Working Papers from Toronto Metropolitan University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a comprehensive theory of large games in which players have names and determinate social-types and/or biological traits, and identify through four decisive examples, essentially based on a matching-pennies type game, pathologies arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for player's names. In a sufficiently general context of traits and actions, we address this dissonance by showing a saturated probability space as being a necessary and sufficient name-space for the existence and upper hemi-continuity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games with traits. We illustrate the idealized results by corresponding asymptotic results for an increasing sequence of finite games.

Keywords: Large games; social-type; traits; idealized limit game; saturated probability space; pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; closed-graph property; upper hemi-continuity; asymptotic implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D50 D82 G13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Large games with a bio-social typology (2013)
Working Paper: On Large Games with a Bio-Social Typology (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp035

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