Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game
Federico Weinschelbaum,
David Levine,
Salvatore Modica and
Felipe Zurita
Additional contact information
Salvatore Modica: Universita degli Studi di Palermo
No 109, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia
Abstract:
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.
Keywords: impatience trap; farmer-sheriff game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2010-07, Revised 2011-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Downloads: (external link)
https://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc109.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmer-sheriff game (2012) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
Working Paper: Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (2011) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
Working Paper: Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game (2011) ![Downloads](/downloads_econpapers.gif)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:109
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Maria Amelia Gibbons (repec@udesa.edu.ar).