American Federalism, Political Inequality, and Democratic Erosion

Jacob M. Grumbach and Jamila Michener

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2022, vol. 699, issue 1, 143-155

Abstract: The United States has a particularly decentralized form of federalism that provides important authority to multiple levels of government. This decentralization is typically seen as beneficial for democratic politics. But while federalism both constrains and enables democratic participation, we argue that it does so unevenly, and in ways that deepen inequalities in the processes of democracy. We propose four mechanisms by which the institutional decentralization of American federalism obstructs or reduces democratic accountability and equality: (1) inequality in venue selection, (2) information asymmetry, (3) an unequal exit threat, and (4) decentralized accountability. In contemporary American politics, these mechanisms both create and expand advantages for economic and political elites, while generating and deepening barriers to the full and equitable inclusion of less powerful groups in society, especially economically and racially marginalized Americans.

Keywords: federalism; inequality; democracy; race; class; American politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:699:y:2022:i:1:p:143-155

DOI: 10.1177/00027162211070885

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