Commitment problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Bradley C. Smith

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2024, vol. 41, issue 5, 494-513

Abstract: This paper applies the logic of commitment problems to deliver insights about the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the canonical crisis bargaining framework, an anticipated power shift can cause bargaining failure. Bargaining breaks down in this context because a declining state reasons that fighting in the present from a strong position is preferable to negotiating in the future from a weaker position. I argue that this logic is relevant for understanding both Ukrainian and Russian decisionmaking in the lead-up to the invasion. The commitment problem logic also provides insight into the role of NATO in the conflict, highlighting flaws in existing arguments that the Russian invasion was “provoked†by NATO.

Keywords: alliance politics; bargaining; commitment problems; game theory; Russia; Ukraine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:41:y:2024:i:5:p:494-513

DOI: 10.1177/07388942241248027

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