The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union

Antoaneta Dimitrova and Bernard Steunenberg
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Antoaneta Dimitrova: Leiden University, The Netherlands

European Union Politics, 2000, vol. 1, issue 2, 201-226

Abstract: This article addresses the question of whether European integration leads to convergence in the domestic policies of the member states of the European Union. Some recent studies claim that as a result of European integration the national policies of the member states are becoming more alike. The existence of various exemptions and `flexibility' arrangements in the revisions of the Treaty of Rome as well as problems with implementation seem to contradict this view. In this article we offer a model based on insights from game theory and analytical politics, which aims to explain the conditions under which convergence may occur and the limitations of this process at the legislative and implementation stages of European policy making.

Keywords: flexibility; game theory; legislation; policy implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:1:y:2000:i:2:p:201-226

DOI: 10.1177/1465116500001002003

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