Party group coordinators and rapporteurs: Discretion and agency loss along the European Parliament’s chains of delegation

Lukas Obholzer, Steffen Hurka and Michael Kaeding

European Union Politics, 2019, vol. 20, issue 2, 239-260

Abstract: The European Parliament organizes its legislative activities along two chains of delegation to the rapporteurs – one institutional, one partisan. We analyze discretion and agency loss along these chains of delegation from the perspective of party group coordinators who select the rapporteur on behalf of the party group. Do coordinators minimize agency loss towards their national party, their European party group, the committee median or the plenary median when allocating reports? Data from the 2009–2014 legislative term demonstrate that coordinators tend to select rapporteurs who are close to their own national party’s ideal point on the integration dimension. This has important implications for intra-parliamentary and intra-party delegation, party group cohesion and broader policy-making in the European Union.

Keywords: Coordinators; delegation; European Parliament; party groups; rapporteurs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:20:y:2019:i:2:p:239-260

DOI: 10.1177/1465116519827383

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