Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the European Union

Christophe Crombez
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Christophe Crombez: Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, USA, and Department of Applied Economics, University of Leuven, Belgium crombez@stanford.edu

European Union Politics, 2002, vol. 3, issue 1, 7-32

Abstract: This article presents spatial models of policy-making in the European Union and focuses on interest group lobbying. It analyzes the two principal legislative procedures: consultation and codecision. Lobbying is modeled as a game of strategic information transmission from an informed lobbyist to uninformed policy makers. The theory characterizes sets of proposals that can be adopted under both procedures and determines the proposers' optimal proposal strategies. It analyzes the lobbyist's lobbying strategies at the proposal and vote stages, and studies policy makers' voting strategies. The article's principal conclusions are that at the proposal stage it is optimal for the lobbyist to lobby a policy maker with preferences close to her own, whereas at the vote stage it is optimal for her to lobby the pivotal policy maker.

Keywords: European Union; legislative procedures; lobbying; agenda setting; information transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:7-32

DOI: 10.1177/1465116502003001002

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