Frequent Auctions for Intraday Electricity Markets

Christoph Graf, Thomas Kuppelwieser and David Wozabal

The Energy Journal, 2024, vol. 45, issue 1, 231-256

Abstract: Continuous trading is currently becoming the standard for intraday electricity markets. In this paper, we propose frequent auctions as a viable alternative. We argue that batching orders in auctions potentially leads to lower liquidity cost, more reliable, less noisy price signals, and allows for better alignment of market outcomes with the technical realities of the transmission grid. In an empirical study, we compare the German continuous intraday market with counterfactual outcomes from frequent auctions. We find that traded volumes tend to be higher for continuous trading; however, the auction market benefits from lower liquidity costs and less noisy price signals. Furthermore, we critically discuss the suitability of continuous trading in the presence of network constraints and technical restrictions of conventional units. Taken together these findings suggest that in sparsely traded intraday markets, pooling orders in frequent auctions may be beneficial.

Keywords: Intraday electricity markets; Frequent auctions; Continuous trading; Market design; Electricity markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:enejou:v:45:y:2024:i:1:p:231-256

DOI: 10.5547/01956574.45.1.cgra

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