Format Effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Melvin Guyer, John Fox and Henry Hamburger
Additional contact information
Melvin Guyer: Mental Health Research Institute University of Alberta
John Fox: Department of Sociology University of Alberta
Henry Hamburger: School of Social Sciences University of California (Irvine)

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1973, vol. 17, issue 4, 719-744

Abstract: Three different presentation formats of the same Prisoner's Dilemma game were investigated. Fifteen pairs of male subjects were assigned to each of three experimental conditions. One group played a conventional matrix representation of the game, one group played an expected value representation of the game, and one group played a simplified probabilistic version of the game called "Take-Some." Each pair of subjects played their game for fifty trials.

Date: 1973
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