Preventive War and the Balance of Power

Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook
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Emerson M. S. Niou: Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook
Peter C. Ordeshook: Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Division of Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987, vol. 31, issue 3, 387-419

Abstract: Preventive wars are commonly defined as wars initiated by a major power to preempt an anticipated disadvantageous position in terms of resources or military capabilities owing to the differential growth rates of countries. This essay extends a game-theoretic model of the balance of power to admit differential growth rates and also to permit countries to adjust their investments for the future. After establishing the conditions for equilibrium investment strategies, we then examine the properties of the nation-system that this equilibrium implies. Specifically, using a two-period model, we are interested in those first-period equilibria in which, because their sovereignty is subsequently threatened, countries will prefer to instigate a preventive war. We conclude by arguing that, although differential growth rates and the period 1 equilibria that initial resources imply can threaten the sovereignty of countries, there are a variety of coalitional strategies available to countries and that only some of them imply preventive war.

Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:31:y:1987:i:3:p:387-419

DOI: 10.1177/0022002787031003001

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