The Determinants of Democratic Transitions

Yi Feng and Paul J. Zak
Additional contact information
Paul J. Zak: School of Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate University

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1999, vol. 43, issue 2, 162-177

Abstract: A formal dynamic theory of the transition from a developing autocracy to democracy is presented in the context of a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium growth model. The theory shows that the primary determinants affecting the timing of democratic transitions are per capita income, the distribution of wealth, educational levels, and the strength of preferences for political rights and civil liberties. The implications of the theory are tested by estimating a proportional hazard function to determine the probability of a democratic transition at a particular point in time. The empirics demonstrate strong support for the model in an estimation of 75 countries during the postwar period.

Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002799043002003 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:43:y:1999:i:2:p:162-177

DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043002003

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().