Three Two Tango: Territorial Control and Selective Violence in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza

Ravi Bhavnani, Dan Miodownik and Hyun Jin Choi
Additional contact information
Ravi Bhavnani: Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA, bhavnani@msu.edu
Dan Miodownik: Departments of Political Science & International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Hyun Jin Choi: Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2011, vol. 55, issue 1, 133-158

Abstract: This article extends the formal logic of Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence to account for three political actors with asymmetric capabilities. In contrast to Kalyvas’ theory, the authors’ computer simulation suggests that (1) selective violence by the stronger actor will be concentrated in areas where weaker actors exercise control; (2) the relative level of selective violence used by weaker actors will be lower because of a reduced capacity to induce civilian collaboration; and (3) areas of parity among the three actors will exhibit low levels of selective violence perpetrated primarily by the strongest actor. Results from a logistic regression, using empirical data on Israel and two rival Palestinian factions from 2006 to 2008, are consistent with these predictions: Israel was more likely to use selective violence in areas largely controlled by Palestinian factions; zones of incomplete Israeli control were not prone to selective violence; and zones of mixed control witnessed moderate levels of selective violence, mainly by Israel. Nonetheless, Palestinian violence remained consistent with Kalyvas’ predictions.

Keywords: violence; control; Israel; West Bank; Gaza; agent-based model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/55/1/133.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:55:y:2011:i:1:p:133-158

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().