Collective Bargaining in a Basic North American Sports League Model With Broadcasting Revenue

Paul Madden

Journal of Sports Economics, 2019, vol. 20, issue 8, 1088-1118

Abstract: The general firm/trade union bargaining literature is brought to bear on a specific North American sports league model, where talent supply is perfectly inelastic and profit-maximizing clubs receive local (gate) revenue plus an equal share of league broadcasting revenue. Club and player representatives negotiate a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on the levels of local revenue sharing, salary cap, and salary floor. Results characterize the set of efficient bargains and the Nash bargaining solution and show how they are affected by increases in broadcasting market size, focusing on player salaries, competitive balance, the content of CBA documents, and comparisons with laissez-faire.

Keywords: collective bargaining agreements; broadcasting revenue; efficient bargains; Nash bargaining solutions; revenue sharing; salary caps; salary floors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1527002519851156 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:20:y:2019:i:8:p:1088-1118

DOI: 10.1177/1527002519851156

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Sports Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().