Owner Objectives and Competitive Balance

Rodney Fort and James Quirk

Journal of Sports Economics, 2004, vol. 5, issue 1, 20-32

Abstract: A growing literature on leagues composed of owners maximizing winning percentage shows that particular league rules have different impacts compared with leagues composed of profit-maximizing owners. But the underlying question of how to distinguish between the two types of leagues has received no treatment. In this article, we show that the two types of leagues can be distinguished in the talent market. A league of winning-percentage-maximizing owners will have higher talent costs and greater demand for talent. But, and perhaps more important, the level of competitive balance between the two types of leagues is indeterminate. In addition, a new policy instrument is suggested, namely, nudging owners toward one or the other objective, depending upon the particular locations of the demand for talent if owners pursue profits or winning percentage.

Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jospec:v:5:y:2004:i:1:p:20-32

DOI: 10.1177/1527002503261275

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