Party Dominance and the Logic of Electoral Design in Mexico’s Transition to Democracy

Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Beatriz Magaloni
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Alberto Diaz-Cayeros: University of California, Los Angeles, acayeros@polisci.ucla.edu
Beatriz Magaloni: Stanford University, University of California, Los Angeles, magaloni@leland.stanford.edu

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2001, vol. 13, issue 3, 271-293

Abstract: This paper discusses the role of electoral institutional design in Mexico’s transition to democracy. Our argument is that electoral rules facilitated party dominance through two mechanisms: electoral rules disproportionately rewarded existing majorities and, at the same time, discouraged potential majorities from forming. More specifically, the rules rewarded parties that could win a majority of the vote in single-member districts; but at the same time, rewarded minority parties with seats from multi-member districts, mitigating Duvergerian incentives to coordinate behind a single challenger. In the short run, seats from multi-member districts benefited opposition parties by significantly reducing entry costs; in the long run, however, these seats helped sustain party dominance, by discouraging coordination among opposition parties and voters.

Keywords: democracy; electoral system; institutional design; party dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:271-293

DOI: 10.1177/095169280101300303

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