The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index

Matthew Braham and Manfred J. Holler
Additional contact information
Matthew Braham: braham@econ.uni-hamburg.de
Manfred J. Holler: University of Hamburg, holler@econ.uni-hamburg.de

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2005, vol. 17, issue 1, 137-157

Abstract: This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which classical measures such as the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, and Public Good indices have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player preferences. It has been argued that an index that is blind to preferences misses a vital component of power, namely strategic interaction. In this vein, there has been an attempt to develop so-called strategic power indices on the basis of non-cooperative game theory. We argue that the criticism is unfounded and that a preference-based power index is incompatible with the definition of power as a generic ability: ‘the ability to affect outcomes’. We claim that power resides in, and only in, a game form and not in a game itself.

Keywords: ability; game theory; power indices; strategic power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:1:p:137-157

DOI: 10.1177/0951629805047801

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