Resource allocation when different candidates are stronger on different issues

Patrick Hummel

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2013, vol. 25, issue 1, 128-149

Abstract: I present a model in which different candidates are stronger on different issues and an incumbent must decide how many resources to devote to each of two different issues. I derive conditions under which the incumbent has an incentive to devote an inefficiently high amount of resources to the issue in which the incumbent is weakest so that voters will be relatively more concerned about the issue on which the incumbent is strongest and be more inclined to vote for a candidate that is strong on that issue. I find that incumbents are especially likely to use an inefficient resource allocation if voters care a lot about the issue in which the incumbent is strongest before the election or they will care moderately about multiple issues after the election.

Keywords: elections; incumbents; issue ownership; political candidates; resource allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:25:y:2013:i:1:p:128-149

DOI: 10.1177/0951629812454770

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