Electoral competition with ideologically biased voters

Marco Magnani

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2017, vol. 29, issue 3, 415-439

Abstract: This paper studies pork barrel spending in a model where two symmetric parties compete for an electorate consisting of groups which have different ideological preferences. In equilibrium, party electoral promises decrease with voter ideological biases, and a “swing voter†outcome emerges. In this context, a problem of exclusion from party transfer plans arises which depends on ideology distribution. Groups with extreme ideological preferences are excluded from these plans, and also within moderate groups a share of voters receives a nil transfer from the parties. This exclusion problem is generally reduced if a transformation of the electorate occurs which decreases the polarization of the distribution of ideology.

Keywords: Exclusion from party transfer plans; ideology; pork barrel spending (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D72 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:29:y:2017:i:3:p:415-439

DOI: 10.1177/0951629816650761

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