Pricing Treatments Cost-Effectively when They Have Multiple Indications: Not Just a Simple Threshold Analysis

Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert and Lauren E. Cipriano
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Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert: Department of Health Policy and Center for Health Policy, Stanford School of Medicine and Freeman Spogli Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Lauren E. Cipriano: Ivey Business School and Departments of Epidemiology & Biostatistics and Medicine, Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada

Medical Decision Making, 2023, vol. 43, issue 7-8, 914-929

Abstract: Background Economic evaluations of treatments increasingly employ price-threshold analyses. When a treatment has multiple indications, standard price-threshold analyses can be overly simplistic. We examine how rules governing indication-specific prices and reimbursement decisions affect value-based price analyses. Methods We analyze a 2-stage game between 2 players: the therapy’s manufacturer and the payer purchasing it for patients. First, the manufacturer selects a price(s) that may be indication specific. Then, the payer decides whether to provide reimbursement at the offered price(s). We assume known indication-specific demand. The manufacturer seeks to maximize profit. The payer seeks to maximize total population incremental net monetary benefit and will not pay more than their willingness-to-pay threshold. We consider game variants defined by constraints on the manufacturer’s ability to price and payer’s ability to provide reimbursement differentially by indication. Results When both the manufacturer and payer can make indication-specific decisions, the problem simplifies to multiple single-indication price-threshold analyses, and the manufacturer captures all the consumer surplus. When the manufacturer is restricted to one price and the payer must make an all-or-nothing reimbursement decision, the selected price is a weighted average of indication-specific threshold prices such that reimbursement of more valuable indications subsidizes reimbursement of less valuable indications. With a single price and indication-specific coverage decisions, the manufacturer may select a high price where fewer patients receive treatment because the payer restricts reimbursement to the set of indications providing value commensurate with the high price. However, the manufacturer may select a low price, resulting in reimbursement for more indications and positive consumer surplus. Conclusions When treatments have multiple indications, economic evaluations including price-threshold analyses should carefully consider jurisdiction-specific rules regarding pricing and reimbursement decisions. Highlights With treatment prices rising, economic evaluations increasingly employ price-threshold analyses to identify value-based prices. Standard price-threshold analyses can be overly simplistic when treatments have multiple indications. Jurisdiction-specific rules governing indication-specific prices and reimbursement decisions affect value-based price analyses. When the manufacturer is restricted to one price for all indications and the payer must make an all-or-nothing reimbursement decision, the selected price is a weighted average of indication-specific threshold prices such that reimbursement of the more valuable indications subsidize reimbursement of the less valuable indications. With a single price and indication-specific coverage decisions, the manufacturer may select a high price with fewer patients treated than in the first-best solution. There are also cases in which the manufacturer selects a lower price, resulting in reimbursement for more indications and positive consumer surplus.

Keywords: value-based pricing; price-threshold analysis; price regulation; cost-effectiveness analysis; welfare analysis; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:medema:v:43:y:2023:i:7-8:p:914-929

DOI: 10.1177/0272989X231197772

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