Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy

Meg Elizabeth Rithmire

Politics & Society, 2017, vol. 45, issue 1, 123-153

Abstract: This article critically examines the origins and evolution of China’s unique land institutions and situates land policy in the larger context of China’s reforms and pursuit of economic growth. It argues that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has strengthened the institutions that permit land expropriation—namely, urban/rural dualism, decentralized land ownership, and hierarchical land management—in order to use land as a key instrument of macroeconomic regulation, helping the CCP respond to domestic and international economic trends and manage expansion and contraction. Key episodes of macroeconomic policymaking are analyzed, with the use of local and central documents, to show how the CCP relied on the manipulation and distribution of the national land supply either to stimulate economic growth or to rein in an overheating economy. China’s land institutions, therefore, share “complementarities†with fiscal and financial institutions and benefit powerful political actors while imposing costs on marginal ones.

Keywords: China; economic reform; land policy; macromanagement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:45:y:2017:i:1:p:123-153

DOI: 10.1177/0032329216683167

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