Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality

Samuel Scheffler
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Samuel Scheffler: University of California, Berkeley, USA, schefflr@socrates.berkeley.edu

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2005, vol. 4, issue 1, 5-28

Abstract: Many recent political philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that choice and responsibility can be incorporated into the framework of an egalitarian theory of distributive justice. This article argues, however, that the project of developing a responsibility-based conception of egalitarian justice is misconceived. The project represents an attempt to defuse conservative criticism of the welfare state and of egalitarian liberalism more generally. But by mimicking the conservative’s emphasis on choice and responsibility, advocates of responsibility-based egalitarianism unwittingly inherit the conservative’s unsustainable justificatory ambitions, unattractive moralism, and questionable metaphysical commitments. More importantly, they misrepresent the nature of our concern with equality as a value.

Keywords: choice; distributive justice; egalitarianism; egalitarian liberalism; equality; luck egalitarianism; responsibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:4:y:2005:i:1:p:5-28

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X05049434

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