Evolutionary game theory and the normative theory of institutional design: Binmore and behavioral economics

Don Ross ()

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2006, vol. 5, issue 1, 51-79

Abstract: In this article, I critically respond to Herbert Gintis's criticisms of the behavioral-economic foundations of Ken Binmore's game-theoretic theory of justice. Gintis, I argue, fails to take full account of the normative requirements Binmore sets for his account, and also ignores what I call the ‘scale-relativity’ considerations built into Binmore's approach to modeling human evolution. Paul Seabright's criticism of Binmore, I note, repeats these oversights. In the course of answering Gintis's and Seabright's objections, I clarify and extend Binmore's theory in a number of respects, integrating it with Kim Sterelny's and Don Ross's recent (respective) work on the evolution of people as cultural entities. The account also yields a novel basis for choosing between socialism (broadly conceived) and what Binmore calls ‘whiggery’ as normative political programs.

Keywords: theory of justice; bargaining theory; evolutionary game theory; human evolution; Ken Binmore; Herbert Gintis; Kim Sterelny (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:5:y:2006:i:1:p:51-79

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X06060619

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