Separating Trust from Cooperation in a Dynamic Relationship

Toshio Yamagishi, Satoshi Kanazawa, Rie Mashima and Shigeru Terai
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Toshio Yamagishi: Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, Japan, toshio@let.hokudai.ac.jp
Satoshi Kanazawa: London School of Economics and Political Science
Rie Mashima: Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University
Shigeru Terai: Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University

Rationality and Society, 2005, vol. 17, issue 3, 275-308

Abstract: In this article we introduce a new experimental game called Prisoner’s Dilemma with Variable Dependence (PD/D), which allows players to separate their trust in their exchange partners from their cooperation with them in an ongoing relationship. The game allows researchers to observe the emergence of trust and cooperation separately, and ascertain the causal relationship between them. In six studies that use the PD/D design, we find that the players of PD/D consistently achieve very high cooperation rates, sometimes mean cooperation rates of about 95%, which are higher than in standard PD games sharing similar design features. These findings demonstrate that separating trust from cooperation is critical for building trust relations. They also show that the GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation In Tension reduction) strategy helps build such relations in the absence of mutual trust. Our results suggest that it is cooperation which leads to trust, not the other way around.

Keywords: trust; cooperation; prisoner’s dilemma; risk taking; trust game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:17:y:2005:i:3:p:275-308

DOI: 10.1177/1043463105055463

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